We study information design problem with a continuum state and a discrete signal space. We argue that the designer’s value function affects the selection of optimal information structure only through its curvature and identify a dual relation between the prior distribution and the marginal value function. Under convex value functions, the optimal information structure is interval partitional where the width of intervals are single-dipped. Specifically, the designer acquires more precise information around the area where either the state is more likely to be realized or the value function changes faster. We also provide comparative statics regarding the change of prior distributions and value functions. Then we extend our analysis to S-shaped value functions. Finally, we apply the theoretical results to study a series of economic applications and provide novel insights to these well-studied problems.

Employees’ novel ideas often do not get recognized or valued by their managers, thus precluding these ideas from benefiting the organization. Drawing on the social-cognitive model of creativity evaluation (Zhou & Woodman, 2003) and integrating it with a social network lens, this paper investigates how characteristics of the social networks of managers and employees play a role in influencing managers’ valuation of and willingness to implement novel employee ideas. In three studies— an experimental study manipulating idea novelty and the functional diversity of idea evaluators’ (i.e., managers’) network, and two network field studies (with managers evaluating actual product ideas generated by employees)—we document how managers generally disfavor novelty, and therefore, are unwilling to implement novel ideas. However, we find that managers’ advice network diversity and employees’ centrality in the advice network among their peers mitigate this negative effect. Managers are able to better appreciate the value of novel ideas when they have more diverse networks and when idea-proposing employees have high centrality in their peer network. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing the Renminbi by staggering the entry of different types of foreign investors into its domestic bond market and propose a dynamic reputation model to explain this strategy. Our framework rationalize China’s strategy as trying to build credibility as an international currency issuer while reducing the cost of capital flight. We provide a sufficient statistic to measure countries’ reputation over time and show that it can be estimated using micro data on foreign investors’ portfolios. We use our framework to explore how countries compete to become a reserve currency provider.